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TAXING COMPENSATORY STOCK RIGHTS
TRANSFERRED IN DIVORCE*
GREGG POLSKY** & KATHLEEN DELANEY THOMAS***
Stock-based compensation has become increasingly prevalent in
recent years. As a result, many high net worth divorces now
result in the transfer of compensatory stock rights from the
employee spouse to the nonemployee spouse as part of the
marital settlement. Despite this growing trend, the tax
consequences of these transfers have not yet been explored fully.
This Article endeavors to fill this void and explain both the
planning opportunities and potential pitfalls in transferring
compensatory stock rights in divorce. These transfers can shift
ordinary income from a high-bracket spouse to a lower-bracket
spouse, creating a tax surplus that enlarges the marital estate. On
the other hand, these transfers can result in counterintuitive tax
consequences because the income tax effects are surprisingly
inconsistent with the employment tax effects. This inconsistency
can lead to misunderstandings about which party is intended to
bear the burden of these taxes. In addition, despite recent IRS
guidance in this area, the taxation of transfers of unvested stock
rights remains highly uncertain. In light of the opportunity for
income shifting, the potential for confusion, and the continuing
legal uncertainty, tax and legal advisors on both sides of a
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past thirty years, there has been a veritable explosion in
the amount of incentive compensation paid to senior executives of
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public corporations, both in nominal terms and relative to salary
compensation.1 The conventional wisdom is that performance-based
pay is necessary to better align managerial incentives with the desires
of shareholders.2 The most common form of incentive compensation
is stock-based compensation, such as stock options and restricted
stock.3
Given this trend in favor of stock-based compensation, it is not
surprising that compensatory stock rights are transferred from the
employee spouse to the nonemployee spouse in many high net worth
divorces. Yet, despite the prevalence of both stock-based pay and
divorce4 in the United States, the tax consequences of these transfers
have not yet been explored fully. This Article endeavors to fill this
void and explain both the planning opportunities and potential pitfalls
in transferring compensatory stock rights in divorce.
Such transfers can be beneficial to both parties if they can shift
income from a higher-bracket spouse to a lower-bracket spouse,
creating a “tax surplus”5 that can be shared by the parties. However,
which party bears the burden of the tax on income from stock rights
transferred in divorce is not always clear. Guidance from the IRS has
clarified that income from vested stock rights—such as vested stock
options—that are transferred in divorce is properly taxable to the
transferee spouse.6 However, that guidance did not clarify the proper
treatment of income from unvested stock rights transferred in divorce,
and case law appears to suggest that the transferor may remain
taxable on such income.7 Further complicating matters is the fact that
the IRS requires that employment taxes be paid by reference to the
1. See David I. Walker, The Law and Economics of Executive Compensation: Theory
and Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 232,
235 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012).
2. See Andrew C.W. Lund & Gregg D. Polsky, The Diminishing Returns of Incentive
Pay in Executive Compensation Contracts, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677, 682–86 (2011)
(explaining the purported agency cost reductions resulting from incentive compensation).
3. See Walker, supra note 1, at 237 (noting that “equity compensation accounts for
well over half of the aggregate ex ante value of executive pay at large public companies”
and that “equity compensation is viewed as particularly important in aligning managerial
and shareholder incentives”).
4. From 2000 through 2011, there were approximately 900,000 divorces and
annulments per year in the United States. See National Marriage and Divorce Rate Trends,
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/
marriage_divorce_tables.htm (last updated Feb. 19, 2013) (excluding a few states).
5. A “tax surplus” is the tax that is saved from shifting income from a higher-bracket
spouse to a lower-bracket spouse can be shared by the parties by adjusting the amount of
income transferred.
6. Rev. Rul. 2002-22, 2002-1 C.B. 849.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 73–82.
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transferor spouse’s wages even when the transferee spouse bears the
tax on income from vested stock rights transferred in divorce.8
Due to the legal uncertainty surrounding transfers of stock rights
in divorce, particularly transfers of unvested stock rights, this Article
makes a number of tax-planning recommendations to assist taxpayers
and their advisors. It first suggests that parties avoid transfers of
unvested stock rights, if possible, or delay any such transfers until
vesting. If those options are not feasible, we recommend that the
parties seek a private letter ruling or, as an alternative, adopt a
constructive trust approach in which the transferor spouse bears the
nominal tax burden on income from unvested stock rights while the
economic burden is borne by the transferee spouse.
We then offer recommendations for legal reform, suggesting that
the government issue binding guidance clarifying which party is
properly taxed on income arising from unvested stock rights
transferred in divorce. Current case law appears to require that the
transferor should bear the tax burden, though the issue is not entirely
free from doubt. However, to simplify matters for the parties and to
enable consistent treatment between vested stock rights and unvested
stock rights, we suggest that the IRS issue a safe harbor allowing the
parties to agree that the transferee spouse will pay the tax on income
from unvested stock rights transferred in divorce.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the general
taxation of compensatory stock rights, including restricted stock,
stock options, and contractual stock-based rights (i.e., stock
appreciation rights and phantom stock units). Part II describes the
general tax treatment of divorce-related property transfers. Part III
then analyzes the core issue of this Article, which intersects the two
previous parts: how income from compensatory stock rights should be
taxed when those rights are transferred as part of a divorce
settlement. Part IV addresses the planning issues that must be
considered when stock rights are part of the marital estate. Part V sets
forth recommendations for reform to reduce the unnecessary legal
complexity associated with divorce-related transfers of stock rights.
I. TAXATION OF STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION GENERALLY
In general, compensatory transfers of property, such as stock, are
taxed to the recipient upon grant or, if the property is not fully vested

8. Rev. Rul. 2004-60, 2004-1 C.B. 1051.
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at grant, at the time the property subsequently vests.9 The amount of
gross income realized by the recipient of fully vested property is
generally equal to the fair market value of the property at the time of
the grant.10 If the property is unvested at grant, the recipient generally
realizes gross income equal to the fair market value of the property at
the time of vesting.11 In essence, these rules provide that, for federal
income tax purposes, transfers of unvested property are generally
held in abeyance until the property vests, at which point the transfer
is treated as occurring and subject to tax at that time.12 However, for
most compensatory stock options, special rules apply that delay the
taxable event beyond vesting to the time of exercise or the sale of the
underlying stock.13
This Part discusses the taxation of the common types of stockbased rights: restricted stock, stock options, stock appreciation rights,
and phantom stock units. The discussion begins with restricted stock,
which is taxed under the general rules described above.

9. See I.R.C. § 83(a) (2012). In general, unvested property is property that is subject
to a substantial risk of forfeiture at the time it is granted. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(b) (as
amended in 2005). Most commonly, the vesting condition is the performance of services
over a specified period of time. See id. § 1.83-3(c)(1) (providing that a “substantial risk of
forfeiture exists where rights in property that are transferred are conditioned, directly or
indirectly, upon the future performance . . . of substantial services”). A common
arrangement for stock-based compensation is for the stock rights to vest ratably over a
three-to-five year period of service. See David I. Walker, The Non-Option: Understanding
the Dearth of Discounted Employee Stock Options, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1505, 1513 n.28 (2009).
10. The discussion above assumes that the property is granted to the service provider
for no consideration other than services. If the service provider pays an amount of cash (or
other property) for the granted property, then the inclusion amount is reduced by the
amount paid by the service provider. See I.R.C. § 83(a).
11. If unvested property is transferred, the service provider can make an election
under § 83(b) at grant; this election would cause the service provider to effectively treat
the property as fully vested at grant. See id. § 83(b). Accordingly, if a § 83(b) election is
made, the service provider must include the fair market value of the property on the date
of grant. See id.
12. These general rules apply broadly to all sorts of compensatory property transfers,
whether stock-based or not. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (defining “property” for § 83
purposes to include all types of real and personal property except unfunded and unsecured
promises to pay money or property in the future).
13. See I.R.C. § 83(e)(3) (explaining that § 83 does not apply to the transfer of an
option without a readily ascertainable fair market value); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(b) (as
amended in 2004) (defining option with a readily ascertainable fair market value
extremely narrowly); see also Ethan Yale & Gregg D. Polsky, Reforming the Taxation of
Deferred Compensation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 571, 588 (2007) (noting that it is “extraordinarily
rare” for compensatory options to be considered to have a readily ascertainable fair
market value).
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A. Restricted Stock
Restricted stock is stock transferred (usually without any cost or
at a significant discount) to an employee that is unvested at grant.14
Restricted stock is often time-vested, meaning that it vests after a
specified period of continuous employment after grant.15 Restricted
stock can also be performance-vested, meaning that it vests upon the
attainment of specified performance conditions, or it can be subject to
a combination of time- and performance-vesting.16 If the stock does
not vest, it reverts back to the employer.17 The employer has great
flexibility in determining the vesting period and conditions, but
restricted stock is most commonly time-vested with vesting periods
between three and five years.18
Restricted stock is taxed under the traditional rules governing
compensatory transfers of property19 and, thus, is generally taxable
upon vesting,20 with the amount of income based on the fair market
value of the stock at that time.21 For example, if restricted stock with a
value of $10 is transferred without cost to an employee in Year 1, and
the stock thereafter vests in Year 2 when it is worth $15, the
employee realizes $15 of ordinary income in Year 2. The employee
will also take a $15 basis in the stock at the same time. The $15 of
ordinary income realized by the employee constitutes wages for
employment tax purposes, so it is also subject to employment taxes.22
When the employee subsequently sells the stock, the employee will

14. MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY 240 (4th ed. 2009).
15. See Walker, supra note 9, at 1513.
16. See id. An example of combined time- and performance-vested restricted stock is
stock that vests upon the later of (i) one year of continuous employment, and (ii) the date
on which a specified level of earnings per share is attained.
17. Michael S. Knoll, The Section 83(b) Election for Restricted Stock: A Joint Tax
Perspective, 59 SMU L. REV. 721, 722 (2006).
18. See John F. Coyle & Gregg D. Polsky, Acqui-Hiring, 63 DUKE L.J. 281, 297–98 &
n.61 (2013) (noting that, in Silicon Valley, equity compensation typically vests “ratably on
a monthly basis over three to four years” with a “one-year cliff”).
19. See I.R.C. § 83(a) (2012).
20. Restricted stock recipients can elect under § 83(b) to make the granting of
restricted stock the taxable event (with the amount of compensation determined by the
value of the stock at that time), see id. § 83(b), but this election is typically only made
when the restricted stock is purchased by the employee at, or very close to, fair market
value, such that the compensatory aspect of the transaction is minimal.
21. If the restricted stock were granted for free, then the employee would include the
full value in gross income; if the restricted stock were purchased by the employee, then the
employee would include the excess of the value over the purchase price in gross income. If
the stock never were to vest, then there would be no tax consequences.
22. See Rev. Rul. 79-305, 1979-2 C.B. 350.
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realize capital gain or capital loss to the extent of the difference
between the sales price and this $15 basis.23
B.

Stock Options

Another common form of stock-based compensation is stock
options, which represent the right to purchase a share of stock at a
predetermined price (referred to as the “strike price”) during a
specified period.24 Compensatory stock options usually become
exercisable (“vest”) only after a specified period of employment.25
Stock options typically have a strike price equal to the fair market
value of the underlying stock at the time of grant,26 vest ratably over a
three-to-five year period, and expire ten years after grant.27
Under the general rules governing the taxation of compensatory
transfers of property, options would be taxable upon grant or, if the
options are unvested at grant, upon subsequent vesting.28 However,
because of the perceived difficulty in valuing stock options before
they are exercised,29 a special tax regime applies to them.30
To determine the tax consequences stemming from
compensatory stock options, the options must first be classified as
either incentive stock options (“ISOs”) or nonqualified stock options
(“NQSOs”).31 In order to qualify as an ISO, stock options must meet
all of the criteria listed in I.R.C. § 422(b).32 One criterion is that the
23. Any capital gain would not be subject to employment taxes because it would not
be characterized as either wages or self-employment income; however, I.R.C. § 1411’s net
investment income tax might apply to it. See I.R.C. § 1411(c).
24. SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 14, at 245.
25. Stock options can also be performance-vested or be subject to a combination of
performance and time vesting. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
26. Since the 2004 enactment of I.R.C. § 409A, which generally taxes stock options
with a strike price below fair market value at the time of grant harshly, in-the-money
options are exceedingly rare. See Walker, supra note 9, at 1508–09, 1514.
27. See Coyle & Polsky, supra note 18, at 297–98 & n.61. There may be “cliff” vesting
for the first batch of options, such that all of the Year 1 will vest on the first anniversary,
with the remaining options vesting monthly on a ratable basis over the remaining vesting
period.
28. See I.R.C. § 83(a).
29. See 3 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 60.5.2 (3d ed. 2001) (explaining that the difficulty in
valuation of options is the justification for the special tax treatment of options).
30. See I.R.C. § 83(e)(3) (taxing compensatory stock options without a readily
ascertainable fair market value when the options are exercised, rather than when they are
granted or when they vest); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7 (as amended in 2004) (same).
31. See Walker, supra note 9, at 1508 n.8.
32. See I.R.C. § 422(b). There are numerous conditions to ISO treatment in § 422, but
the most significant are: (i) the option must be granted pursuant to a stock-option plan
approved by shareholders within twelve months of the date of adoption of the plan by the
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terms of the option must not designate the option as not an ISO.33 As
described below, the tax treatment of ISOs is often disadvantageous
for employers;34 therefore, many employers explicitly designate their
options as non-ISOs.35 Any compensatory stock options that are not
ISOs, whether because of an explicit designation or because they do
not meet the substantive criteria, are characterized as NQSOs.
1. Taxation of NQSOs
Except in highly unusual circumstances,36 there are no tax
consequences to either the employer or the employee upon grant or
vesting of NQSOs.37 In general, upon the exercise of a NQSO, the
employee recognizes compensation income equal to the difference
between the fair market value of the underlying stock on the date of

board of directors; (ii) the option, by its terms, must not be transferable by the employee
except by will or the laws of descent and distribution; and (iii) the number of ISOs that
first become exercisable during a taxable year is limited under § 422(d). See id. § 422(b),
(d).
33. See id. § 422(b) (“Such term [incentive stock option] shall not include any option
if (as of the time the option is granted) the terms of such provide that it will not be treated
as an incentive stock option.”).
34. See infra Part I.B.2.
35. See Scott Jaquette, Matthew Knittel, & Karl Russo, Recent Trends in Stock
Options 4–5 & n.6 (U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysts, OTA Working
Paper 89, 2003), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/taxanalysis/Documents/ota89.pdf (estimating that approximately 90% of the options issued in
the late 1990s and early 2000s were NQSOs).
36. If a compensatory stock option is considered to have a readily ascertainable fair
market value upon grant, then there would be tax consequences upon grant or, if the
option is unvested at the time of grant, upon vesting of the option. In order for a
compensatory option to be considered to have a readily ascertainable fair market value
upon grant, either the option must be actively traded on an established market or all of the
following conditions must be satisfied at the time of grant:
(i) The option is transferable by the [employee]; (ii) [t]he option is exercisable
immediately in full by the [employee]; (iii) [t]he option or [the stock underlying
the option must not be] subject to any restriction or condition (other than a lien or
other condition to secure the payment of the [exercise] price) which has a
significant effect upon the fair market value of the option; and (iv) [t]he fair
market value of the option privilege is readily ascertainable . . . .
Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(b) (as amended in 2004). As mentioned above, it would be extremely
unusual for a compensatory option to be characterized as having a readily ascertainable
fair market value at the time of grant under these rules. See supra note 30 and
accompanying text.
37. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(a) (providing that, when an option lacking a readily
ascertainable fair market value is granted, the transfer of stock pursuant to the option
exercise is subject to I.R.C. § 83(a)).
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exercise and the option’s strike price (the “spread”),38 and the
employer receives a corresponding deduction in the same amount.39
The employee’s income is characterized as ordinary income for
federal income tax purposes and as wages for federal employment tax
purposes.40 The employee’s basis in the shares received pursuant to
the option exercise is the fair market value of the underlying stock at
the time of exercise, increased by any transaction costs (such as
broker’s fees) incurred in connection with the exercise. Therefore, if,
as is commonly done, the employee sells the underlying stock
immediately after exercise in a “cashless exercise,”41 the employee
will recognize ordinary income on the spread as well as a very small
short-term capital loss equal to the transaction costs incurred in
connection with the sale of the underlying stock.
2. Taxation of ISOs
Turning now to ISOs, there are also no tax consequences to
anyone upon the grant or vesting of these options.42 The tax
consequences upon exercise of an ISO and the sale of the underlying
stock depend on whether the ISO holding-period condition is
satisfied.43 To satisfy this condition, after exercise of the ISO, the
employee must not dispose of the underlying stock before the later of
(i) two years from the date of the grant of the ISO or (ii) one year
from the date of the exercise of the ISO.44 If this holding-period
condition is satisfied, then the employee does not recognize any
income upon exercise of the option.45 Instead, the employee
recognizes long-term capital gain (or loss) only upon the sale of the
underlying stock.46 The capital gain (or loss) is equal to the difference
between the exercise price of the ISO and the sales proceeds from the
38. See id. (providing that I.R.C. § 83(a) applies upon the option’s exercise); see also
I.R.C. § 83(a) (taxing compensatory property transfers to the extent that the value of the
property exceeds the amount paid for the property).
39. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(a) (as amended in 2003) (stating that a corresponding
deduction to the employer is allowable under I.R.C. § 162).
40. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1(a)(1) (1978) (stating that income inclusion under I.R.C.
§ 83 is characterized as compensation).
41. In a cashless exercise, the employer delivers to the employee a cash amount
representing the spread between the strike price and the fair market value of the stock at
the time of exercise (reduced by applicable tax withholding).
42. See I.R.C. § 421(a)(1).
43. See id. § 421(a)(1), (b).
44. See id. § 422(a).
45. See id. § 421(a). The exclusion of gain upon the exercise of ISOs is a preference
item for alternative minimum tax (“AMT”) purposes and, accordingly, can result in
additional tax in the year of exercise by virtue of the AMT. See id. § 56(b)(3).
46. Id. § 421(a).
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stock sale.47 In addition, if the ISO holding-period condition is
satisfied, the employer does not receive any deduction at any time
with respect to the ISO.48
If the ISO holding-period condition is not satisfied, because the
holder makes a premature “disqualifying disposition” of the
underlying stock, the tax consequences are consistent with those that
result from NQSOs.49 The employee would recognize the spread
between the exercise price and the fair market value of the underlying
stock (as of the date of exercise) as compensation income, and any
post-exercise appreciation or depreciation would be characterized as
capital gain or loss.50 And, as in the context of NQSOs, the employer
would receive a compensation deduction equal to the spread.51
The tax benefits to the employee of ISO treatment are deferral
and character conversion. If the holding-period condition is satisfied,
instead of recognizing compensation income immediately upon
exercise of the option, the holder recognizes capital gain only upon
the subsequent sale of the underlying stock. However, the cost to the
employer of ISO treatment (if the holding-period condition is
satisfied) is that the employer relinquishes its entire deduction upon
the employee’s exercise of the option. For employers without
substantial net operating losses, the cost of losing this deduction
typically exceeds the tax benefits realized by the employee, which
makes the ISO instrument tax-inefficient.52 This inefficiency explains
why NQSOs remain far more popular than ISOs.53

47. Cf. id. § 421(a)(1) (providing that the exercise of an ISO is not a taxable event,
therefore implying that the ultimate transfer of the underlying stock is the appropriate
taxable event).
48. See id. § 421(a)(2).
49. See id. § 421(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.421-2(b)(1)(i) (as amended in 2004).
50. See Treas. Reg. § 1.421-2(b)(1)(i).
51. See id. If a disqualifying disposition occurs in a taxable year after the taxable year
in which the option was exercised, the employee’s ordinary income and the employer’s
compensation deduction would be realized in the year of the disposition, not in the earlier
year of exercise. See I.R.C. § 421(b). In such a case, while the amount of ordinary income,
compensation deduction, and capital gain or loss will be the same as if the ISO was a
NQSO, the timing will be slightly different. On the other hand, if the disqualifying
disposition occurs in the same year as the exercise (as in the case of a cashless exercise),
the tax consequences would be identical to those that would result if the ISO had been a
NQSO.
52. See Jeffrey M. Colón, Double Dipping: The Cross-Border Taxation of Stock
Options, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 171, 194–95 (2003) (explaining that ISOs are generally tax
inefficient relative to NQSOs).
53. See Jaquette, Knittel, & Russo, supra note 35, at 5 n.6.
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Synthetic Stock-Based Rights: SARs and PSUs

When stock options are exercised or restricted stock is issued,
the number of outstanding shares increases unless an equivalent
amount of shares is simultaneously redeemed. To prevent dilution of
existing shareholders, employers sometimes create synthetic
instruments that replicate the economics of stock options or restricted
stock without increasing the number of shares outstanding.54 Stock
appreciation rights (“SARs”) are contractual rights that are
analogous to stock options.55 SARs give the holder the right to be
paid in cash an amount equal to the spread between a specified price,
usually the fair market value of the employer’s shares at the time of
grant, and the value of the employer’s shares on any date chosen by
the employee, subject to the usual vesting conditions.56 Phantom stock
units (“PSUs”) mimic restricted stock shares and give the employee
the right to be paid in cash in an amount equal to the value of the
referenced shares on a specified future date, usually on or shortly
after the vesting date.57
When restricted stock or stock options are actually issued, the
employee is treated as receiving property for tax purposes.58 On the
other hand, SARs and PSUs are not considered property; instead,
they are treated as mere promises to pay money in the future.59 As
mere promises to pay, they are disregarded for tax purposes under
the cash method of accounting used by individuals.60 When the cash is
ultimately paid, the cash payment is simply taxed as compensation
income (i.e., subject to income tax as ordinary income and to
employment taxes as wages). The employer receives a corresponding
deduction at the same time.61

54. See Stuart R. Cohn, Stock Appreciation Rights and the SEC: A Case of
Questionable Rulemaking, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 66, 81 (1979).
55. See id. at 70–71; Walker, supra note 9, at 1512.
56. See Cohn, supra note 54, at 70–71.
57. See Walker, supra note 9, at 1513.
58. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (as amended in 2005) (defining, for I.R.C. § 83
purposes, “property” to mean all “real and personal property other than either money or
an unfunded and unsecured promise to pay money or property in the future”).
59. Id. (excluding “unfunded and unsecured promise[s] to pay money or property in
the future” from the definition of property for I.R.C. § 83 purposes).
60. See Gregg D. Polsky & Brant J. Hellwig, Taxing the Promise to Pay, 89 Minn. L.
Rev. 1092, 1111–13 (2005) (explaining that, under the cash method of accounting, mere
promises to pay are disregarded until ultimate payment is received).
61. See I.R.C. § 404(a)(5) (2012) (providing that deductions attributable to
nonqualified deferred compensation are allowed in the taxable year in which the
employee must include the income).

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 741 (2015)

752

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

D. Summary
A common theme in the tax treatment of the above-described
stock rights, which is key to the topic of this Article, is tax deferral.
The employee earns stock rights through the performance of services
over a period of time, usually over multiple taxable years. Yet, the
taxable event occurs only at the very end of that service period or
after it. The taxation of restricted stock is deferred until the very end
of the service period, while the taxation of stock options is deferred
until the exercise (in the case of NQSOs) or sale of the underlying
stock (in the case of ISOs), and the taxation of SARs and PSUs until
cash payment.62
The taxation of compensatory stock-based rights is summarized
in the following table:
Type of Stock
Right
Restricted Stock
NQSO
ISO (if holding
period
satisfied63)
SAR

PSU

Taxable
Event
Vesting of
stock
Exercise of
option
Sale of
underlying
stock
Receipt of
cash

Character of
Income
Ordinary/Wages

Receipt of
cash

Ordinary/Wages

Ordinary/Wages
Capital Gain/
Not Wages
Ordinary/Wages

Employer’s
Consequence
Deduction
upon vesting
Deduction
upon exercise
No deduction
at any time
Deduction
upon payment
of cash
Deduction
upon payment
of cash

Tax deferral allows for the possibility that stock-based rights
could be transferred in an equitable distribution before the taxable
event. Such a “midstream” transfer raises the tax issue of who will
report the income from those rights: the employee spouse who has
earned or will earn the entitlement to those rights or the
nonemployee spouse who will ultimately receive the cash benefits
from those rights? This question is addressed below in Part III.

62. See supra Part I.
63. If the holding period is not satisfied, then the tax consequences of ISOs are
generally the same as NQSOs. See I.R.C. § 421(b).
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However, before focusing on transfers of stock rights, one must
understand the general framework for taxing divorce settlements,
which is the subject of the next part. Part II first discusses I.R.C.
§ 1041, which generally governs transfers of property between
spouses in divorce and provides that neither party is taxed on the
transfer. Part II then examines the common law assignment of income
doctrine, which taxes certain transferors on income generated by
property that has been transferred to another party, whether or not in
the context of divorce. This doctrine is relevant to transfers of stock
rights because the taxable event (e.g., vesting of restricted stock) may
occur after the stock right has been transferred, potentially causing
the transferor to be taxed on income received by the transferee.
Finally, Part II discusses how § 1041 and the assignment of income
doctrine interrelate when unvested property is transferred as part of a
divorce settlement. As described below, the Ninth Circuit has held
that when unvested property rights are transferred in a divorce, the
assignment of income effectively trumps § 1041, resulting in the
transferor spouse being taxed on income generated by the property
after the transfer. Part III will then relate these concepts to stockbased compensation transferred in divorce.
II. SECTION 1041 AND THE ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME DOCTRINE
Section 1041 provides that divorce-related transfers of property
have no immediate tax consequences (i.e., neither the transferor nor
the transferee is taxed on the transfer) and that the transferee spouse
receives the property with a carryover basis from the transferor
spouse.64 Congress enacted this rule to “make the tax laws as
unintrusive as possible with respect to relations between spouses.”65
Section 1041 unquestionably applies to nearly all kinds of property
commonly transferred in a divorce, such as houses, cars, jewelry, and
assets held for investment, such as stocks, bonds, and real estate.66
However, the application of § 1041 to transfers of compensatory
stock rights is not straightforward because of the section’s theoretical
conflict with the common law assignment of income doctrine. That
doctrine, which provides that compensation is always taxable to the
person who earned it, is intended to prevent taxpayers from
64. I.R.C. § 1041(b).
65. H.R. REP. NO. 98-432, pt. 2, at 1492 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1131,
1135.
66. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1T(a), Q&A (4) (as amended in 2003) (providing that
“transfers of property (whether real or personal, tangible or intangible) are governed by
section 1041”).
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deflecting income onto others through transfers.67 For example, in the
famous assignment of income case Lucas v. Earl,68 the Supreme Court
held that a husband was taxable on all of the compensation in respect
of his personal services, even though he had previously contracted to
give half of all such compensation to his wife.69 The Court explained
that the “tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and
contracts however skillfully devised to prevent the salary when paid
from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it.”70 As a
policy matter, the assignment of income doctrine makes sense
because a contrary rule would allow easy income shifting from higherbracket donors to lower-bracket donees; this would undermine the
tax law’s progressive rate structure.71
The conflict between § 1041 and the assignment of income
doctrine in the context of compensatory stock rights stems from the
fact that the employee spouse performs the personal services that give
rise to the stock rights and cause them to vest, while the nonemployee
spouse may hold those rights when the normal taxable event (e.g., the
exercise of an option) occurs. If § 1041 controls, then the
nonemployee spouse, who took a carryover basis in the stock rights at
the time of transfer, should report the income from the later taxable
event. If the assignment of income doctrine controls, then the
employee spouse should report the income notwithstanding the fact
that the nonemployee spouse now holds the relevant property.72
The leading case on the conflict between § 1041 and the
assignment of income doctrine is Kochansky v. Commissioner,73 a

67. See Brant J. Hellwig, The Supreme Court’s Casual Use of the Assignment of
Income Doctrine, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 751, 766–75 (explaining the scope and purpose of
the doctrine).
68. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
69. Id. at 114–15.
70. Id. at 115.
71. See Hellwig, supra note 67, at 769–70 & n.107.
72. It is possible that the application of the assignment of income doctrine could also
accelerate the timing of the taxable event. For example, if the employee spouse transfers
NQSOs on the date of divorce, it is possible that the employee spouse could realize
income on that date (to the extent of the fair market value of the option at the time), even
though had the employee spouse held onto those options, no tax would be due until
exercise. See, e.g., I.R.S. Field Serv. Advice Mem. 200005006, at 2 (Feb. 4, 2000)
[hereinafter FSA], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0005006.pdf (concluding that
the employee spouse realizes compensation income on the date of the transfer of stock
options to the extent of the spread, while the nonemployee spouse realizes capital gain or
loss when the option or underlying stock was sold or when the option expired). However,
as discussed below, the IRS reversed its position in this field service advice when it
subsequently issued Revenue Ruling 2002-22, 2002-1 C.B. 849.
73. 92 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 1996).
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1996 Ninth Circuit decision. In that case, the taxpayer, a plaintiff’s
lawyer, had entered into a contingent fee agreement with a client in a
medical malpractice case.74 During the course of the malpractice case,
the taxpayer divorced and, in connection with the divorce, transferred
a one-half interest in his contingent fee rights to his former spouse.75
The malpractice case eventually settled, and the former spouse
received half of the contingent fee.76 The issue was whether the
taxpayer was taxable on the entire fee or only the one-half portion
that he had retained.77 Citing Lucas v. Earl and other assignment of
income cases, the Ninth Circuit held that the entire fee, including the
portion that had been transferred incident to the divorce, was taxable
to the taxpayer.78
While Kochansky suggests that the assignment of income
doctrine trumps § 1041 when the two are in conflict, doubts have
remained. In the aftermath of that case, some commentators harshly
criticized the decision on both technical and policy grounds.79 In
addition, because Kochansky involved only the transfer of “unvested”
rights—i.e., an interest in a contingency fee with respect to which the
taxpayer had to continue to perform services before it matured—its
rule might not apply to transfers of rights that have already vested
before divorce.
Consider, for example, a transfer of stock options that vested
before they were transferred in a divorce. Would the holding in
Kochansky that the transferor is taxed upon the eventual taxable
event (i.e., exercise) apply equally in this context? It is not entirely
clear that it would. In Kochansky, the taxpayer performed some
services after the marriage that were necessary to cause the
contingent fee rights to “vest,”80 so arguably it makes sense to tax the
74. Id. at 958.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 959. Accordingly, the taxpayer’s spouse was deemed to receive the cash
representing one half of the contingent fee in a tax-free I.R.C. § 1041 transaction.
79. See Deborah H. Geier, Simplifying and Rationalizing the Federal Income Tax Law
Applicable to Transfers in Divorce, 55 TAX LAW. 363, 448–50 (2002) (arguing that the
assignment of income doctrine is irrelevant to Kochansky and that the court’s approach
created unnecessary confusion); Sarah Dods, Note and Comment, Kochansky v.
Commissioner: The Assignment of Income Doctrine, Community Property Law, and I.R.C.
§ 1041, 72 WASH. L. REV. 873, 873 (1997) (arguing that § 1041, rather than the assignment
of income doctrine, should have applied in Kochansky).
80. In a contingent fee agreement, the lawyer generally must continue to work on the
case until it is favorably resolved in order to become entitled to the contingent fee. See,
e.g., Potts v. Mitchell, 410 F. Supp. 1278, 1282 (W.D.N.C. 1976) (holding that an attorney’s
interest in a claim “could not become ‘vested’ in a contingent fee situation until the case
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taxpayer on the fruits of those personal, post-marital services.81 And,
because it can be exceedingly difficult to determine the value of the
pre-divorce services relative to the post-marital services, a rough
justice approach of simply taxing the service-providing spouse on the
entire amount could be justified. On the other hand, when fully
vested rights (such as vested stock options) are transferred, all of the
relevant services were performed while the marital unit (which was
the taxpaying unit at that time) still existed. In theory, the fruits of
those services should be taxed to the marital unit, but that is no
longer feasible once the marital unit has dissolved. Given the
infeasibility, a second-best option seems to be to tax one of the
former spouses in his or her individual capacity.82 In such a case, it is
not clear why taxing the employee spouse is any better of a roughjustice approach than taxing the nonemployee spouse. For this
reason, the Kochansky approach is not necessarily appropriate for
transfers of fully vested rights.
Because of the conflict between § 1041 and the assignment of
income doctrine, as well as the critiques and uncertainties of
Kochansky, the taxation of stock-based rights transferred in divorce
was for many years quite muddled. As discussed in the next Part,

was prosecuted to a favorable judgment or settled by the contracting attorney”); see also
Hardison v. Weinshel, 450 F. Supp. 721, 723 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (finding an attorney’s
withdrawal from a case to be a forfeiture of his contingency fee); Gary v. Cohen, 231
N.Y.S.2d 394, 398 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962) (stating that “if an attorney is justifiably
discharged, he is not entitled to recover compensation from his client”); Royden v.
Ardoin, 331 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Tex. 1960) (standing for the proposition that, if an attorney
voluntarily quits the case or is discharged by the client for cause, then the attorney
generally is entitled to no fee).
81. In Kochansky, the court found that the taxpayer transferred “only the right to
receive the income” (i.e., the “fruits”) rather than income-producing property (the
“tree”). See 92 F.3d at 959. Accordingly, he remained subject to tax on the income from
the contingent fee arrangement under the assignment of income doctrine. Id. Important to
the court’s analysis was the fact that Kochansky “continued to render and control the
personal services that produced the fee.” Id. In contrast, in Meisner v. United States, 133
F.3d 654 (8th Cir. 1998), the Eighth Circuit found that the transferee spouse was taxable on
income produced by royalty rights that were transferred in a divorce. See id. at 657. The
court reasoned that the assignment of income doctrine did not apply because the
transferor spouse had transferred “an income-producing asset” (the “tree”) to the
transferee. Id. at 656. In that case, the transferor provided no ongoing services that
produced the royalties and retained no control over the transferred rights. Id. at 657.
Arguably, the transfer of vested stock rights may be more like the situation in Meisner,
while the transfer of certain unvested stock rights may be more analogous to Kochansky.
For further discussion, see infra Part III.B.
82. Another approach would be to accelerate the taxable event but, as discussed
below, that would raise significant administrative burdens and therefore would not be a
workable approach.
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recent developments have substantially clarified matters in some
respects, though some uncertainties still remain.
III. TRANSFERS OF STOCK-BASED RIGHTS IN DIVORCE: THE
CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
This Part discusses the current state of the law regarding divorcerelated transfers of compensatory stock-based rights. In 2002, the IRS
issued a revenue ruling clarifying that § 1041 trumps the assignment
of income doctrine, at least with regard to stock rights that are fully
vested prior to transfer.83 However, the tax treatment of transfers of
unvested rights remains ambiguous.
Section A of this Part discusses the IRS’s approach to transfers
of stock rights in divorce before the issuance of Revenue Ruling 200222. In earlier private guidance, the IRS took the position that the
assignment of income doctrine applied to transfers of NQSOs and
that the transferor was therefore taxable on such transfers at the time
of the transfer. As discussed in Section B, the IRS retreated from this
position—at least with respect to transfers of vested options—in
Revenue Ruling 2002-22, in which the IRS ruled that the transferee
was taxable upon exercise pursuant to § 1041. The IRS did not rule on
the proper treatment of transfers of unvested stock rights, leaving the
law unclear in this area. Section C then discusses additional guidance
issued by the IRS on the employment tax consequences of
transferring vested stock rights in divorce, which provides that the
employee spouse bears the nominal burden of such taxes even though
the transferee bears the income tax burden.
A. Pre-2002 Treatment of Transfers of Stock Rights in Divorce
Prior to 2002, the IRS took the position that the assignment of
income doctrine applied to divorce-related transfers of compensatory
stock-based rights.84 In a 2000 Field Service Advice (“FSA”),85 a
husband transferred NQSOs to his wife in connection with their
divorce, and his wife subsequently exercised the options.86 The FSA

83. See Rev. Rul. 2002-22, 2002-1 C.B. 849.
84. See FSA, supra note 72, at 6.
85. Id. at 1. A FSA is case-specific advice that is provided by the IRS Office of Chief
Counsel to revenue agents in the field.
86. In the FSA, the husband transferred both ISOs and NQSOs. However, because
one of the conditions to ISO status is nontransferability, the FSA determined that the
transfer caused the ISOs to be recharacterized as NQSOs. This particular conclusion of
the FSA was subsequently confirmed in Revenue Ruling 2002-22, 2002-1 C.B. 849.
Because the ISOs immediately morphed into NQSOs, the taxation of all of the transferred
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analyzed the tax consequences of the transfer and the subsequent
exercise and concluded that, notwithstanding § 1041, the husband
recognized ordinary income when the options were transferred, not at
the time of exercise,87 which is the traditional taxable event for
NQSOs.88 The amount of income realized by the transferor was the
fair market value of the options at the time of transfer.89 The FSA
explained that, when in conflict, the assignment of income doctrine
trumps § 1041.90
The lifespan of the FSA was not long, as it was quickly
superseded by a 2002 Revenue Ruling.91 Nevertheless, several aspects
of the FSA are worth noting. First, the FSA did not indicate whether
the options were vested or unvested at the time of transfer, even
though the 2002 Revenue Ruling subsequently drew a significant
distinction along that line.92 Perhaps, because the FSA did not draw
any distinctions between vested and unvested options, its conclusion
would have been the same in either case, but this is certainly
debatable.93
Second, in addition to taxing the husband-transferor, the FSA
also accelerated the taxable event, which is something that
Kochansky did not do. Had the husband retained and exercised the
options, he would not have been taxed until exercise.94 The FSA
determined the taxable event to be the transfer of the options, which,
by definition, must occur before exercise.95 However, the assignment
of income doctrine is generally understood to affect merely the
attribution of income, not the timing of income realization.96 Yet, in
options was identical, and the discussion above disregards the irrelevant temporary ISO
status.
87. FSA, supra note 72, at 2.
88. See supra Part I.B.1.
89. FSA, supra note 72, at 2.
90. Id. at 5–6.
91. Rev. Rul. 2002-22, 2002-1 C.B. 849.
92. Compare id. (drawing a distinction between vested and unvested options), with
FSA, supra note 72, at 2 (leaving unresolved the significance of whether an option was
vested or unvested).
93. Under the facts of the FSA, the options ultimately were exercised, so if they were
unvested at the time of transfer, they subsequently did in fact vest. See FSA, supra note 72,
at 2.
94. As explained above in supra note 86, the transferor transferred both ISOs and
NQSOs, though the transfer caused the ISOs to immediately morph into NQSOs. Had the
transferor retained the ISOs, the taxable event would have been delayed until the sale of
the underlying stock.
95. If the transfer occurred post-exercise, then the transferor would have been
transferring stock, not options.
96. See, e.g., Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122, 124–25 (1940) (holding that, when an
insurance salesman gratuitously transferred the rights to future renewal commissions, the
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this case, the FSA determined that the assignment of income doctrine
not only caused the husband to be taxed with respect to the options,
but it also accelerated the husband’s income realization.97
Third, the FSA’s approach created some significant
administrative complexity. The FSA concluded that, upon the
transfer, the husband was taxed on the fair market value of the
options, not on the spread between the value of the underlying stock
and the exercise price of the options.98 Because there is value in the
option privilege, which is “the opportunity to benefit during the
option’s exercise period from any increase in the value of property
subject to the option during such period, without risking any capital,”
the fair market value will always exceed the spread to some extent.99
However, determining the value of the option privilege is often
difficult, and this valuation difficulty is precisely what justifies the
unique wait-and-see approach to taxing compensatory stock
options.100 Under the FSA’s approach, options must be prematurely
valued when they are transferred in a divorce.
In addition to creating valuation issues, the FSA’s approach
doubles the number of taxable events. If options are not transferred
in connection with a divorce, the exercise of an option is the single
taxable event in the typical situation where options are cashlessly
exercised.101 In the FSA, the husband’s transfer constituted a taxable
event, and the husband’s gross income amount became the wife’s
adjusted basis in the option.102 When the wife subsequently exercised
the option, the exercise price was added to that adjusted basis, and
when the wife thereafter sold the underlying stock, she would
recognize gain or loss to the extent her amount realized exceeded that
salesman was taxed on those commissions under the assignment of income doctrine at the
time the commissions were received by the donee); see also MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN &
LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION ¶ 8.02, at 254 (12th ed. 2012)
(explaining that the timing of tax in Eubank was correct because if the assignment of the
rights “produced income to the taxpayer—that would be a rule of realization rather than
one of mere attribution”).
97. FSA, supra note 72, at 4–5.
98. Id. at 5.
99. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(b)(3) (as amended in 2004).
100. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 29, ¶ 60.5.2. As discussed above, the general
rule for compensatory property transfers is that they are taxed at either transfer or vesting,
while NQSOs are generally taxed only upon exercise.
101. See SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 14, at 254 n.19 (estimating that 75% of NQSO
exercises are followed by the immediate sale of the underlying stock). Even in a cashless
exercise, the immediate sale is a second taxable event, but as explained above, this will
result in a de minimis short-term capital loss equal to the amount of transaction costs
incurred in exercising the option and selling the underlying stock.
102. FSA, supra note 72, at 2.
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adjusted basis.103 Thus, under the FSA, there was a taxable event for
the husband when he transferred the option, and there would be a
second taxable event for the wife when she eventually sold the
underlying stock.
Finally, the FSA’s approach placed potentially onerous reporting
burdens on employers. When the husband transferred the option, he
realized compensation income to the extent of the fair market value
of the option. This means that the employer would have to report that
value as wages and make the necessary withholding at that time, and
these burdens were the result of unilateral action taken by the
employee.104
B.

Treatment of Transfers of Stock Rights in Divorce Under Revenue
Ruling 2002-22

Perhaps because of these administrative issues created by the
approach in the 2000 FSA, the IRS quickly reversed course in
Revenue Ruling 2002-22.105 The ruling described the same basic facts
as in the FSA: a transfer of NQSOs incident to a divorce, followed by
the nonemployee spouse exercising those options.106 The ruling,
however, reached a completely different conclusion, holding that
§ 1041 applied to the transfer.107 As a result, the transferor did not
realize any income, the transferee took a carryover (i.e., zero) basis in
the options, and the transferee was taxed upon exercise.108 The

103. Because the option would not be a compensatory option in the wife’s hands, it
would no longer be subject to the tax rules governing these types of options. Instead, the
tax rules governing purchased options would apply. Those rules effectively tax options on
an open transaction method, under which the holder does not recognize gain or loss until
the underlying stock is ultimately sold (if the option is exercised) or until the option is sold
or expires unexercised. See Rev. Rul. 78-182, 1978-1 C.B. 265.
104. See Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(a)-1(a)(4) (as amended in 2006) (stating that noncash
remuneration is generally subject to withholding).
105. Rev. Rul. 2002-22, 2002-1 C.B. 849. While field service advice is nonbinding and
does not represent an official position of the IRS, a revenue ruling is an official
interpretation of the law by the IRS. See Mitchell Rogovin & Donald L. Korb, The Four
R’s Revisited: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance, and Retroactivity in the 21st Century: A View
From Within, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 323, 330–31, 356–57 (2008). Thus, Revenue Ruling 2002-22
effectively overrules FSA 200005006.
106. The fact pattern in the ruling did not involve ISOs, but the ruling confirmed that
ISOs transferred in a divorce automatically convert into NQSOs, so the analysis would
have been the same had ISOs been involved.
107. Rev. Rul. 2002-22, 2002-1 C.B. 849.
108. Upon exercise, the transferee would realize ordinary income in an amount equal
to the spread between the fair market value of the underlying stock (at the time of
exercise) and the exercise price, which is the same tax consequence that would have
occurred had the transferor retained and exercised the option.
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transferee effectively stepped into the transferor’s shoes with respect
to the option.
1. Transfers of Vested Stock Rights
The NQSOs at issue in Revenue Ruling 2002-22 were vested at
the time of transfer. The ruling essentially clarified that § 1041 applies
to transfers of vested stock options in divorce. Accordingly, in
contrast to the approach taken by the IRS in the 2000 FSA, the
transferor realized no tax consequences with respect to the
transferred options.109 Additionally, the taxable event was not
accelerated but instead occurred at the time that the options were
exercised.110 This approach is much simpler than the FSA approach,
as it obviates the need for any premature valuation of the options and
limits the number of taxable events to one. And as discussed above in
Part II, this approach is not necessarily inconsistent with Kochansky,
because that case involved a transfer of unvested property rights in a
divorce.
2. Transfers of Unvested Stock Rights
While Revenue Ruling 2002-22 clarified the treatment of vested
options (and, by analogy, vested SARs), it carved out unvested rights
from its scope, noting:
This ruling also does not apply to transfers of nonstatutory
stock options, unfunded deferred compensation rights, or other
future income rights to the extent such options or rights are
unvested at the time of transfer or to the extent that the
transferor’s rights to such income are subject to substantial
contingencies at the time of the transfer.111
This carve-out applies to unvested NQSOs, which are specifically
mentioned, and to unvested SARs and unvested phantom stock
arrangements, because these constitute unfunded, deferred
compensation rights that are unvested at the time of transfer. The
carve-out also applies to restricted stock because these are “future
income rights” that are “unvested at the time of transfer.”112

109. See Rev. Rul. 2002-22, 2002-1 C.B. 849.
110. Id.
111. Id. (citing Kochansky v. Comm’r, 92 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 1996)).
112. If the restricted stock has vested before the transfer, then it is no longer restricted
stock at the time of transfer and § 1041 clearly would apply. Of course, the vesting would,
absent an I.R.C. § 83(b) election, have been a taxable event for the transferor. If a § 83(b)
election had been made, then the restricted stock is treated as unrestricted stock for
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The ruling’s citation to the Kochansky case seems to indicate that
Kochansky would apply when these unvested rights are transferred in
connection with a divorce. The transfer of unvested rights is
analogous to the fact pattern in Kochansky, where the contingent fee
lawyer transferred half of his “unvested” contingent fee rights to his
spouse, who later collected half of the fee when the case was
settled.113 The Ninth Circuit held that the transferor spouse, not the
transferee spouse, was liable for the tax on the transferee spouse’s
share (as well as his own share).114 The citation to Kochansky
therefore suggests that the transferor of unvested stock rights is taxed
when the normal taxable event occurs (i.e., upon the vesting of
restricted stock, the exercise of NQSOs, or the cash settlement of
SARs and PSUs).
The analogy to Kochansky is particularly apt with respect to
restricted stock, as well as PSUs that are immediately settled upon
vesting. The lawyer in Kochansky had to work on the case until it was
successfully resolved before he became entitled to the contingent
fee,115 and the taxable event (i.e., the receipt of the fee) occurred
quickly thereafter.116 Likewise, holders of restricted stock and settledupon-vesting PSUs must work for the employer until the vesting date
before the rights vest; the taxable event therefore occurs
simultaneously with vesting.
The analogy to Kochansky is less apt in other cases because the
taxable event does not necessarily occur simultaneously with vesting;
in fact, the taxable event could occur many years after vesting. For
instance, consider a NQSO with a one-year vesting period that is
transferred one day prior to vesting. If the option is exercised nine
years after the transfer, the situation looks a lot different than
Kochansky. Because the taxable event occurred nine years after
vesting, much of the value of the option could be attributable not to
the transferor’s personal services, but rather to the transferee’s
investment decision to delay exercising the option for nine years. On
the other hand, in Kochansky, the entirety of the contingent fee was
attributable to the husband’s work effort because payment was made
immediately upon “vesting” of the contingent fee.117

federal
stock.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

income tax purposes, and § 1041 should therefore apply to the transfer of such
See Kochansky v. Comm’r, 92 F.3d 957, 958 (9th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 959.
See cases cited supra note 80.
Kochansky, 92 F.3d at 959.
Id.
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This discussion suggests that, in cases where vesting and the
taxable event do not occur in short order, the resulting income might
be split between the transferor and the transferee spouses. The
amount of the transferor spouse’s income would be equal to the
instrument’s value upon vesting, and the transferee spouse’s income
(loss) would be equal to the appreciation (depreciation) of the
instrument after vesting. But this approach would result in the same
undesirable administrative burdens that afflicted the approach
adopted by the 2000 FSA, which was quickly jettisoned by the IRS.
Most significantly, the splitting of income approach would require
premature valuations of options (i.e., valuation at the time of vesting,
rather than at exercise), yet the current taxation scheme with respect
to options is based on the view that such valuations are unduly
difficult.118 Accordingly, we do not believe that the IRS would adopt
this approach. Instead, when unvested stock rights are transferred, we
believe there will be a single taxable event at the normal time (upon
exercise for NQSOs), but the transferor, rather than the transferee,
will simply be taxed on the entire amount of gross income.119
While the 2002 ruling’s carve-out and explicit citation to
Kochansky strongly imply that the transferor of unvested rights will
remain subject to tax, a somewhat-bizarre private letter ruling
(“PLR”) issued in 2010 casts some doubt on that conclusion. In PLR
201016031, the IRS ruled that restricted stock transferred in a divorce
was taxable to the transferee spouse upon vesting,120 which is the
direct opposite of the result in Kochansky.121 The PLR discussed
118. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. It is possible that, under a splitting of
income approach, all of the income would still be realized upon the traditional taxable
event (e.g., the exercise of an option) but that the resulting income would be split between
the parties at that time based on the fair market value of the option at the time of the
transfer. But even that method would require a premature valuation of the option in order
to determine the split.
119. In fact, this “single taxable event” approach was adopted by the IRS in private
letter rulings involving gratuitous transfers of compensatory stock options, even though
such an approach does not seem to be required by the relevant statute or regulations. See,
e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-52-012 (Dec. 29, 1999) (ruling that, when compensatory
options are transferred by gift, there is no taxable event until exercise, at which point the
transferor pays tax on the entire option spread); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-21-013 (May 27,
1994) (same). While divorce-related transfers are not gratuitous (and, in any event, these
rulings are not binding), they are suggestive of the IRS’s reluctance to tax compensatory
options before exercise due to valuation concerns, even though part of the transferee’s
gain is attributable to his or her investment decision to delay exercise after vesting.
120. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2010-16-031 (Apr. 23, 2010).
121. Compare id. (ruling that the “income attributable to the vesting of the restricted
stock is includible in [the transferee’s] gross income”), with Kochansky, 92 F.3d at 958
(holding that, where the transferor spouse transferred a one-half interest in a future
contingent fee, the entire fee was nevertheless includible in the transferor’s gross income).
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Revenue Ruling 2002-22 but strangely did not even mention the
carve-out for unvested rights, nor did the ruling mention
Kochansky.122 The PLR included no analysis of the unvested-versusvested issue. It simply noted that the divorce decree provided that the
parties intended “a result consistent with Revenue Ruling 2002-22”
and required the transferee spouse to be “responsible for paying all
costs attributable to [the transferee’s] allocation of restricted stock,
including taxes . . . .”123
The ruling’s neglect of Kochansky is particularly surprising. As
discussed above, the transfer of restricted stock is perfectly analogous
to the facts in Kochansky, and the ruling discussed Revenue Ruling
2002-22 but ignored the carve-out, which explicitly refers to that case.
One could interpret the ruling as extending Revenue Ruling 2002-22’s
approach to even unvested rights. But private letter rulings do not
constitute binding precedent on the IRS, except with regard to the
particular taxpayers to whom they are issued,124 while Revenue
Ruling 2002-22, like all revenue rulings, represents an official
interpretation of the law by the IRS and is therefore broadly binding
on the agency.125 The more recent, nonbinding guidance points in one
direction, while the older, binding guidance points in the opposite
direction. Complicating matters further, neither ruling includes any
significant reasoning or analysis.
Accordingly, the best that can be said about transfers of unvested
rights is that their tax treatment remains highly uncertain.126 The
implications of this uncertainty for practitioners are discussed below
Part IV.D. Adding to this confusion is the employment tax treatment
of transfers of stock rights in divorce. As discussed below in Part
122. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2010-16-031 (Apr. 23, 2010).
123. Id. The divorce decree provided that while the transferee spouse was generally
responsible for paying taxes on the restricted stock, the transferor was responsible for
paying employment taxes. Employment taxes are discussed below.
124. See Rev. Proc. 2014-1, 2014-1 I.R.B. 1; see also Rogovin & Korb, supra note 105,
at 330–36 (describing revenue rulings and their legal effect).
125. See IRS, CHIEF COUNSEL DIRECTIVES MANUAL 32.2.2.10(4) (Sept. 16, 2011),
available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part32/irm_32-002-002.html.
126. Further complicating matters is the fact that, in FSA 200005006, the IRS took the
position that the timing of the taxable event should be accelerated to the time of the
transfer of the options in the divorce. If the IRS takes the position in the future that
transfers of unvested stock rights are subject to the assignment of income doctrine rather
than § 1041, it could also take the position that the transferor is subject to tax at the time
of the transfer of the unvested property (rather than at the time of the normal taxable
event, such as exercising an option). However, as discussed above, there does not appear
to be strong legal support for this approach since the assignment of income doctrine
generally does not affect the timing-of-income inclusion. See supra note 96 and
accompanying text.
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III.C, the IRS has adopted a counterintuitive approach that treats
transfers of vested stock rights differently for employment tax
purposes than for income tax purposes.
C.

Employment Tax Consequences of Transferring Vested Stock
Rights in Divorce

While Revenue Ruling 2002-22 clarified the income tax
consequences of some transfers of compensatory stock rights in
divorce, it did not address the employment tax, income tax reporting,
or withholding tax consequences of these transfers. The IRS
subsequently issued Revenue Ruling 2004-60,127 which explained that,
for employment tax purposes, the income realized by the transferee
spouse pursuant to Revenue Ruling 2002-22 is nevertheless still
treated as wages of the transferor (employee) spouse.128 Thus, for
example, upon the transferee’s exercise of a stock option, the
resulting income will be shown on the transferor spouse’s W-2 as
wages and will therefore be subject to employment tax withholding at
the transferor’s employment tax rate.129 That rate depends on the
amount of the transferor’s wages to date at the time of the exercise.130
In 2014, the first $117,000 of wages were subject to an employment
tax rate of 7.65%; the next $83,000 ($133,000 if the taxpayer is
married and filing jointly) to a 1.45% rate; and all remaining wages to
a 2.35% rate.131
The 2004 ruling also explained the income tax reporting and
withholding requirements in this context. Upon the relevant taxable
event, the employer is to report the gross income to the transferee on
a Form 1099-MISC issued to the transferee132 and also to withhold at
the supplemental wage withholding rate (generally 25%133). The

127.
128.
129.
130.

Rev. Rul. 2004-60, 2004-1 C.B. 1051.
Id.
Id.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBL’N 15, (CIRCULAR E), EMPLOYER’S TAX
GUIDE FOR USE IN 2014, at 1–2 (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p15-2014.pdf.
131. Id. (providing for a 6.2% Social Security tax rate plus a 1.45% Medicare tax rate
on first $117,000 of wages; a 1.45% Medicare rate on wages up to $200,000; and an
additional 0.9% Medicare rate on wages over $200,000).
132. Rev. Rul. 2004-60, 2004-1 C.B. 1051 (“Because there is no provision for the
issuance of Form W-2 in the name of a nonemployee spouse, the income realized upon the
exercise of the nonstatutory stock options would be reportable to the nonemployee
spouse . . . on Form 1099-MISC . . . .”).
133. Once supplemental wages reach $1,000,000, the supplemental wage-withholding
rate is increased to 39.6%. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 130, at 18.
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withheld amounts are credited against the transferee’s year-end
income tax liability.134
In practice, these rules work as follows with respect to options.
Typically, holders of compensatory stock options exercise and then
immediately sell the underlying stock in a cashless exercise. In such a
case, the employer would deliver cash to the transferee in an amount
equal to the spread between the stock price (at the time of exercise)
and the strike price, with reductions for supplemental wage
withholding (generally 25%) and employment tax withholding
(calculated with reference to the transferor’s wages to date). SARs
and PSUs, which are always settled in cash,135 have similar results: the
employer delivers the cash amount required under the appropriate
formula, with reductions for supplemental wage withholding and
employment tax withholding. In all cases, the employer reports the
gross income amount to the transferee on a Form 1099-MISC.136
The 2004 ruling is counterintuitive, which can cause confusion.
The 2002 ruling provides that the transferee pays income tax upon the
normal taxable event, and that tax is determined using her marginal
tax rate.137 In contrast, the 2004 ruling requires that the employment
tax liability be determined by using the marginal employment tax rate
of the transferor.138 This inconsistency can lead to disputes as to which
spouse bears the burden of employment taxes. On the one hand, the
2004 ruling directs the employer to withhold employment taxes from
the payment to the transferee,139 which suggests that the transferee
will bear the burden. On the other hand, the transferor spouse gets
Social Security credit for the associated wage income, and the
employment tax is calculated with reference to the transferor spouse’s
W-2 wages, which could imply that the transferor will bear the
employment tax burden. The planning implications of this
inconsistency are discussed below in Part IV.C.
IV. TAX-PLANNING ISSUES
As detailed in Part III, the taxation of transfers of vested stock
rights has recently been clarified, while the taxation of unvested rights
remains highly uncertain. Given the state of the law, there are a host
of tax-planning issues for practitioners to consider. There may be
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Rev. Rul. 2004-60, 2004-1 C.B. 1051.
See supra Part I.C.
Rev. Rul. 2004-60, 2004-1 C.B. 1051.
See Rev. Rul. 2002-22, 2002-1 C.B 849.
Rev. Rul. 2004-60, 2004-1 C.B. 1051.
Id.
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some opportunities for favorable income shifting from a high-bracket
spouse to a lower-bracket spouse. In addition, even where the law is
clear, it is complicated enough to cause confusion and the potential
for future disputes if the marital settlement agreement is not drafted
carefully. Finally, given the ambiguity of the law with respect to
unvested rights, planners should think carefully about how to proceed
in that context. This Part discusses these planning issues.
A. Consider Transfers of Vested Rights to Take Advantage of
Transferee’s Lower Tax Rates
If the transferor is expected to be in a higher marginal tax
bracket than the transferee following the divorce, transfers of vested
options, SARs or PSUs, can be used to save significant amounts of
taxes. Under Revenue Ruling 2002-22, the transferee steps into the
shoes of the transferor with respect to the income tax consequences;140
accordingly, the ordinary income stemming from the ultimate taxable
event will be reported by the lower-bracket spouse. Had the stock
right been retained by the higher-bracket spouse, the ordinary income
would have been reported by that spouse. This higher-bracket to
lower-bracket income shift results in a “tax surplus” that augments
the marital estate, allowing both parties to benefit at the expense of
the national fisc.141
In fact, stock rights provide a unique opportunity to easily shift
large amounts of ordinary income between spouses. Typically, only
capital gains can be easily shifted (through transfers of investment
assets), but the advantage of shifting capital gains is more limited
because of the relative flatness of the capital gains tax-rate
structure.142 Alimony payments could also be used to effectively shift
ordinary income from the higher-bracket spouse to the lower-bracket
spouse,143 but alimony payments are governed by complicated frontloading rules, which generally require the payments to be spread

140. Rev. Ruling 2002-22, 2002-1 C.B 849.
141. Although the transferee spouse will bear the nominal burden of the tax, the two
spouses can effectively split the tax benefit by having the transferor spouse adjust the total
value of assets he transfers.
142. See I.R.C. § 1(h) (2012) (providing for a 15% capital gains rate for taxpayers in
the 25%, 28%, 33%, and 35% tax brackets and a 20% capital gains rate for taxpayers in
the 39.6% bracket). Section 1411 adds a 3.8% additional “net investment income” tax on
capital gains for taxpayers in the 39.6% bracket, and phaseouts can cause the effective
marginal tax rate for high-bracket taxpayers to reach 25%. See id. § 1411(a)(1).
143. See id. §§ 71, 215(a) (providing for the inclusion by the transferee and deduction
by the transferor of alimony payments).
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evenly over three taxable years.144 In addition, alimony payments
must automatically cease upon the death of the transferee in order to
achieve the desired income shifting,145 but cessation upon death may
be inconsistent with the parties’ desires in effecting the equitable
distribution. While the impact of the front-loading and cease-upondeath alimony rules is not insurmountable,146 tax planners do not have
to worry about the cost and complication of circumventing these rules
when compensatory stock rights are transferred.147 Accordingly,
transfers of vested stock rights are the easiest way to shift ordinary
income from the higher-bracket spouse to the lower-bracket spouse.
B.

Consider Avoiding Transferring ISOs

If an ISO is transferred in connection with a divorce, the option
automatically converts to NQSO status because of the statutory
condition that an ISO be nontransferable.148 ISOs provide better tax
results to the holder if the holding-period conditions are satisfied.149
Because of the automatic loss of the potential tax benefits resulting
from ISO status, it would not appear to be tax efficient to transfer
ISOs as part of an equitable distribution.150 However, if the holding144. See id. § 71(f)(1) (providing for recapture of “excess alimony payments”).
145. See id. § 71(b)(1)(D).
146. For example, a December 31 divorce date, combined with three roughly equal
payments and a one-year insurance policy, could effectively circumvent these rules. One
payment would be due on December 31 of the current year, another due on January 1 of
the following year, and the last due on the following January 1. Insurance on the life of the
transferee for one year would protect the transferee against not receiving the full amount
of the bargained-for equitable distribution.
147. Alimony payments must be made in cash, so transfers of compensatory stock
rights would not be subject to the alimony rules. See I.R.C. § 71(b)(1).
148. See Rev. Rul. 2002-22, 2002-1 C.B. 849 (explaining that a transfer of an ISO
incident to divorce would immediately disqualify the option because of the statutory
condition of nontransferability in I.R.C. §§ 422(b)(5) and 423(b)(9)). However, the
transfer of the underlying stock incident to a divorce (rather than the ISO itself) would not
be a disqualifying disposition, regardless of when it occurred. See I.R.C. § 424(c)(4). Thus,
the employee spouse could exercise an ISO prior to the divorce and then transfer the
underlying stock in the divorce without triggering a disqualifying disposition, which would
mean that, provided that the transferee spouse holds the stock long enough, the favorable
capital gains treatment would apply. If the transferee spouse disposes of the stock before
the end of the requisite holding period (taking into account the transferor’s holding
period), then I.R.C. § 424(c)(4) makes clear that the transferee would realize ordinary
income upon the disqualifying disposition. See id.
149. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
150. It is not clear whether a constructive-trust-type structure would work to
circumvent the ISO rule prohibiting transfers. A constructive trust would have the
employee spouse retain legal ownership of the ISO but also allow the nonemployee
spouse to choose when to exercise the ISO, sell the underlying stock, and receive the aftertax proceeds from the sale. Under general tax law principles governing ownership for tax
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period condition would not be satisfied by the transferor if the
transferor were to retain the ISO, then there would be no tax cost in
losing ISO status because the tax results would replicate those
stemming from NQSOs.151 Accordingly, in deciding whether to
transfer ISOs as part of an equitable distribution, the parties would
need to weigh the expected tax cost of losing ISO status, which
depends on the likelihood of satisfying the holding-period condition,
against the burden of relying on transfers of only non-ISO assets to
effect the equitable distribution.
The principal burden of relying on only non-ISO assets to effect
the equitable distribution is the need to value the ISOs. If ISOs are
part of the marital estate but are not transferred, the ISOs would
need to be valued and the transferee spouse’s share of the ISOs
would need to be offset by other property transferred to or retained
by such spouse. Because, as explained more fully below, option
valuation is difficult and subject to dispute, divorcing parties tend to
prefer simply splitting the options to avoid valuation costs and
disputes.152
C.

Make Clear Which Spouse Will Bear the Incidence of the Various
Taxes

The 2002 and 2004 revenue rulings explained the mechanics in
taxing, reporting, and withholding with respect to divorce-related
transfers of vested stock rights. The transferee ultimately includes the
gross income on the transferee’s own federal income tax return. Even
though it may seem obvious that the transferee is responsible for
paying the resulting increase in his income tax, to avoid any confusion
purposes, legal title is not dispositive, and the nonemployee spouse would likely be
considered the tax owner of the ISO under a benefits-and-burdens analysis. Two IRS
private letter rulings (which do not constitute binding precedent) have determined that
constructive trusts did not result in ISO disqualification, but these rulings involved
taxpayers in community property states, where the ISOs could be considered as owned by
the transferee spouse for tax purposes even before the constructive trust was created. See
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2007-37-009 (Sept. 14, 2007); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-19-001 (May
13, 2005).
151. As noted above, the taxation of disqualifying dispositions of ISOs replicates the
taxation of NQSOs. In fact, the tax treatment is identical if the disqualifying disposition
occurs in the same taxable year as the exercise, as would be the case in a cashless exercise.
Otherwise, there would be a slight timing difference. See supra note 51 (explaining the
near-equivalence and the potential timing discrepancy).
152. See Charles F. Vuotto, Jr. & Jeffrey D. Urbach, Stock Option Distribution via
Constructive Trusts in Divorce Settlements, TONNEMAN, VUOTTO, ENNIS, & WHITE LLC,
http://www.tvelaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/StockOptionDistributions.pdf (last visited
Nov. 3, 2014) (explaining the preference for the “deferred distribution approach” over
valuing stock rights).
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the marital settlement agreement or divorce decree should state that
the income tax burden is to be borne by the transferee. The
agreement or decree should also describe the required reporting and
withholding mechanics as well, to avoid any surprises or
misunderstandings.
With respect to employment taxes, it is even more important for
the marital settlement agreement or divorce decree to specify which
party will bear the burden of those taxes. There is a significant
potential for confusion because the employment tax burden will be
determined by reference to the transferor’s taxable wage base. In
addition, the transferor will get FICA credit for those taxes with
respect to the wages up to the FICA wage base, which is currently
$117,000.153 However, in the typical case, this credit will have no
actual effect on the transferor’s Social Security entitlements.154 On the
other hand, Revenue Ruling 2004-60 explicitly provides that the
payment from the employer to the transferee is to be net of the
required employment tax withholding.155 Therefore, absent any
affirmative duty of the transferor spouse to reimburse the transferee
for that amount, the transferee will bear the burden of employment
taxes.
Should the transferor be required to reimburse the transferee for
the employment taxes withheld by the employer? If options are split,
the transferor will bear the employment taxes on her retained
options, so it would seem that the transferee should bear the burden
with respect to the transferred options. In addition, the fact that the
transferor spouse typically would receive no increase in Social
Security entitlements from the inclusion of the wages in the
transferor’s wage base supports the conclusion that the burden should
remain on the transferee. The employment taxes are therefore simply
a cost of exercising the option with no accompanying benefit to the
transferor.
One complication, if the transferee retains the employment tax
burden, is that the applicable employment tax rate will change over
the course of the taxable year as the year-to-date wages increase. In
2014, the first $117,000 of wages is subject to employment taxes at a
rate of 7.65%, the next $83,000 of wages at a rate of 1.45%, and all

153. See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text.
154. For instance, if the transferor would have realized $117,000 of wages in 2014
irrespective of the stock rights, then there would be no effect because there is no Social
Security effect for receiving wages above the wage base.
155. Rev. Rul. 2004-60, 2004-1 C.B. 1051.
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remaining wages at a rate of 2.35%.156 It would not be appropriate for
the transferee to bear the full 7.65% burden in the typical case where
the transferor spouse’s own wages (i.e., salaries, bonus, taxable
benefits, and income from that spouse’s own stock rights) would
exceed $117,000. In situations involving very highly compensated
executive transferors, the transferee spouse can usually avoid the
7.65% rate simply by avoiding exercises or payouts in the early part of
the calendar year. For instance, if the executive’s annual salary is
$600,000 per year, then by the end of March the executive’s wages
from salary alone will already have surpassed the 7.65% employment
tax bracket.157 If this sort of self-help is infeasible or otherwise
undesirable, then the transferee should negotiate for an
indemnification of employment tax withholding that is in excess of
the standard 1.45% or 2.35% rates.158
D. Dealing with Unvested Stock Rights
As explained in Part III, the tax consequences resulting from
divorce-related transfers of unvested stock rights remain highly
uncertain. The carve-out and citation to Kochansky in Revenue
Ruling 2002-22 imply that the transferor will be taxed,159 while a 2010
private letter ruling suggests instead that the transferee will be
taxed.160 The 2010 ruling, however, is not binding on the IRS. Given
this uncertainty, what should advisors do with regard to unvested
rights?

156. See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text.
157. In that case, the executive’s monthly paycheck would be a bit less than $50,000 (a
bit less due to excluded benefits, such as health insurance as well as, potentially, elective
deferrals).
158. The rate should be the marginal employment tax rate that applies to the stock
rights. Thus, if the transferor’s own wages would result in the transferor being taxed at the
margin at 2.35% (i.e., because the transferor’s own wages exceed $200,000), then the
2.35% tax rate should be used. This could actually require the transferee to reimburse the
transferor if the wages from the stock rights cause the transferor to lose some or all of the
benefit of the 1.45% rate that applies to wages between $117,000 and $200,000 (or
$250,000 if the transferor files a joint return). For instance, assume that after the transferor
(who is single) realizes wages of $117,000, the transferee exercises options with a spread of
$83,000; the transferor then realizes additional wages of $83,000. Without any indemnity
by the transferee, the transferee would receive the benefit of the low 1.45% rate on the
$83,000 of stock-right income. But absent the stock-right income, the transferor would
have realized the benefit of that low rate. In that case, the transferee should, in theory, be
required to reimburse the transferor for the extra employment tax paid ($747, which is
$83,000 x .009), but it is probably not worth the trouble.
159. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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1. Avoid Transferring Unvested Rights
One obvious, though often unattractive, approach is to simply
avoid transferring any unvested items in the first place. If an equitable
distribution can be accomplished by transferring only cash, vested
stock rights, and other property, then the tax uncertainty is avoided.
The problem with this approach is that it requires the valuation of the
unvested stock rights. This is because the transferee spouse’s portion
of the unvested stock rights must be offset with other property.
Because valuation of these rights is fraught with complexities,
divorcing parties often desire to simply split existing compensatory
stock rights, rather than attempting the arduous task of valuing the
options.161 Splitting options also may be the ideal approach for sharing
the risk of non-vesting. If the transferor spouse retains all of the
unvested rights, but transfers equivalent value property as an offset,
then the transferor would bear the entire risk of non-vesting.162
Alternatively, the risk of non-vesting could be priced into the offset,
but this would lead to even further complications and opportunities
for disagreement.
For those reasons, a so-called “deferred distribution” approach is
often most desirable.163 To illustrate this approach, assume that an
employee spouse owns 100 options that had an original four-year
vesting period, that the options are part of the marital estate, and that
the filing of the divorce petition (or other appropriate cut-off date164)
occurs exactly two years after grant. Rather than attempt to value the
100 unvested options as part of the marital estate and have the
employee spouse retain all of the options, the parties could agree that
the nonemployee spouse simply be transferred twenty-five of the
options. (The nonemployee spouse might receive twenty-five options
rather than a full share of fifty because half of the vesting period is
attributable to the post-marital services of the employee.165) When a
161. See Vuotto & Urbach, supra note 152 (describing the difficulty in valuing stock
options, particularly unvested ones, and explaining that the deferred distribution approach
is typically preferred over valuing and offsetting options).
162. See Jeffrey D. Urbach, Equity-Based Compensation: Stock Options, in FAMILY
LAW SERVICES HANDBOOK 113, 121 (Donald A. Glenn et. al. eds., 2011) (explaining that,
if valuation and offset were used, the employee spouse would bear the entire risk of
termination before vesting).
163. See id. (noting that “deferred distributions” are the most common way of
allocating options); Vuotto & Urbach, supra note 152;
164. E.g., the date of the separation agreement.
165. Cf. Callahan v. Callahan, 321 A.2d 561, 564 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976)
(distributing 25%, rather than 50%, of unvested options, all of which were marital
property, to the nonemployee spouse presumably because the vesting period continued
into the post-marital period).
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deferred distribution approach is used, the transferor transfers a pro
rata portion of each type of stock right, whether vested or vested to
the transferee. Accordingly, the desire to avoid the tax uncertainty
from transferring unvested rights conflicts with the nontax goal of
avoiding option valuation, and the nontax goal typically prevails.
2. Delay Until Vesting
If vesting of significant stock rights is scheduled to occur in the
near term, the parties could delay executing the marital settlement
agreement until after the vesting date. This delay effectively converts
the transfer of unvested rights into the transfer of vested rights, which
makes the tax uncertainty disappear, at least with respect to those
rights.166 Of course, the parties may not wish to delay executing the
marital settlement, so this may not be an attractive option even if
vesting is imminent. Furthermore, while this approach resolves the
uncertainty with respect to batches of stock rights that will vest in
short order, there may be other, longer-vesting batches.
3. Private Letter Ruling Request
Another option would be to request a private letter ruling from
the IRS. Seeking such a ruling would involve some additional cost
and could take several months, and a favorable ruling cannot be
assured.167 However, the fact that the IRS issued an analogous letter
ruling in 2010 on the issue would ease these concerns somewhat.168 If
significant amounts of unvested rights will be transferred and delay is
not a significant concern, a letter ruling request should be considered.
The letter ruling approach would be particularly attractive if the
transferee is expected to be in a lower tax bracket than the transferor.
As the next subpart explains, a constructive trust approach can be
used, but it would require the transferor to pay the income tax. And,
as described above, the transferor could retain unvested items, but

166. Another possibility might be to delay the effective date of the divorce or transfers
of the options, rather than the execution of the marital settlement agreement, until after
the vesting date. However, conservative tax practitioners might be concerned that the IRS
would consider the transfer to be effective for tax purposes upon the date of execution of a
marital settlement agreement that requires the transfer to be made; if so, the employee
spouse would be treated as transferring unvested stock rights.
167. See, e.g., Michael J. Jones, A Costly and Unnecessary Detour,
WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM (May 1, 2008), http://wealthmanagement.com/retirementplanning/costly-and-unnecessary-detour-0 (explaining that the user fee for PLRs can be
$11,500 or more and that PLRs can take anywhere from a few months to a year to obtain).
168. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2010-16-031 (Apr. 23, 2010).
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that also would require the transferor to pay the income tax.169 A
private letter ruling appears to be the only way to ensure that gross
income from unvested rights is properly reportable by the transferee,
and the tax arbitrage benefits from the resulting income shift could
outweigh the cost and delay of obtaining the ruling.
4. Constructive Trust Approach
If the above approaches are not attractive, the best alternative
would be for the parties to agree that the transferor spouse will (i)
retain legal title to the transferee’s share of the unvested stock rights,
(ii) report the taxes resulting from the taxable event, and (iii) transfer
the after-tax amount to the transferee spouse. Thus, while the
transferor would nominally pay the taxes, the transferee will bear the
economic burden. This arrangement is referred to as a constructive
trust because the transferor holds legal title to the stock rights for the
benefit of the transferee.170
In the case of stock options, the transferor would agree to
exercise the options and sell the underlying stock upon the direction
of the transferee and then immediately transfer the after-tax proceeds
of the sale to the transferee. In the case of restricted stock, the
transferor spouse would transfer, immediately after vesting, the aftertax amount of shares (or, if the transferee directs a sale of those
shares, the after-tax amount of proceeds from the sale of those
shares) to the transferee. In the case of SARs, the transferor would
agree to “exercise” the SAR at the direction of the transferee and
transfer the after-tax amount of cash proceeds to the transferee.
Finally, in the case of PSUs, the transferor would transfer the aftertax amount of cash proceeds upon the specified payout date.
A constructive trust would likely not alter the fact that the
unvested items have been transferred for tax purposes because legal
title is not dispositive as to tax ownership.171 Instead, tax ownership
generally is determined based on the party who bears the “benefits

169. See supra Part IV.D.1.
170. A constructive trust approach can also be used for vested stock rights in cases
where the employer does not permit the employee spouse to transfer those rights, even in
connection with a divorce. As explained below, the constructive trust approach should not
alter the conclusion that the items have been transferred for tax purposes; thus, the tax
consequences should be the same as if legal title to the rights were actually transferred.
171. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 604–05 (1948) (holding that control
over property, rather than legal title, determines tax ownership); Grodt & McKay Realty,
Inc. v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. 1221, 1237–38 (1981) (citing ownership of legal title as one of eight
relevant factors in determining ownership for tax purposes).

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 741 (2015)

2015] COMPENSATORY STOCK RIGHTS IN DIVORCE

775

and burdens of ownership” of the property.172 Because the transferee
benefits from the appreciation and suffers from the depreciation of
the transferee’s share of the stock rights and because the transferee
has the power to direct when stock options and SARs are exercised,
the transferee should be considered to have tax ownership.
Even though the constructive trust approach should not alter the
conclusion that the stock rights have been transferred, the approach
remains attractive for a number of reasons. First, the ultimate tax
reporting by the transferor is consistent with Revenue Ruling 200222’s carve-out of unvested items and its citation to Kochansky.173
Second, in most cases, the transferor will be in the same or higher tax
bracket than the transferee, which means that the IRS would realize
no additional revenue on an overall basis (and may even realize a
reduction in revenue) by challenging the parties’ agreed-upon
approach. Thus, if the IRS were to retreat from its carve-out in
Revenue Ruling 2002-22 and seek to tax the transferee on the stock
rights, it would not realize any additional revenue and would serve
only to disrupt the parties’ agreed-upon allocation of the tax
burden.174 This should diminish even further the remote possibility
that the IRS would reverse course. Third, employers sometimes
preclude or discourage employees from transferring unvested stock
rights, even in a divorce, which would make a constructive trust
necessary if splitting unvested rights (in lieu of valuing them) is
desired. Fourth, because legal title to the relevant items remains in
the hands of its employee and the eventual tax consequences are
reported on the employee spouse’s W-2, the employer’s procedures
for reporting the income are unaffected by the divorce. This simplifies
the employer’s reporting and withholding procedures and reduces the
likelihood of any errors or complications.
The constructive trust arrangement should include some
technical provisions to ensure that it achieves the desired results.
First, the transferor spouse, who has agreed to report the income
from the unvested stock rights upon the appropriate taxable event,
should indemnify the transferee spouse in the event that the IRS were
to decide that the Revenue Ruling 2002-22 methodology (of taxing

172. See Grodt, 77 T.C. at 1237.
173. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
174. As discussed below, the transferee should negotiate for an indemnity to apply in
that situation. In that case, the transferee in the end would bear only a single tax burden
(but at the transferee’s rate, rather than at the transferor’s).
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the transferee) is appropriate even for unvested rights.175 This
indemnity serves two purposes. It ensures that the transferee spouse
is not effectively taxed twice on the rights, first by receiving only the
after-tax proceeds from the transferor and again when the IRS asserts
a deficiency against the transferee. The indemnity will also discourage
the transferor from making an opportunistic claim for refund because
any benefit from the claim for refund would be offset by the
indemnity. The latter purpose is likely more important because the
IRS would almost certainly not choose to challenge the parties’
agreed-upon allocation of the tax burden unless the transferor were
to file a claim for refund, which would require the IRS to
affirmatively act either by denying or accepting the claim.
Second, to calculate the after-tax payments that go to the
transferee spouse upon the appropriate taxable event, the transferor’s
applicable tax rate needs to be determined. In theory, that rate should
be the actual combined (i.e., federal, state, and local) effective
marginal tax rate on the taxable income in question. However, there
are some practical problems in using the actual rate. The actual rate
will be determinable only after the transferor has filed all of his tax
returns for the taxable year in which the taxable event occurs. Thus,
using the actual rate would require a two-step process. First, an
assumed rate would be used to determine the tentative tax on the
stock-right income. The transferor would immediately transfer the
proceeds less the tentative tax. Second, after the transferor’s tax
returns for the year have been filed, a true-up adjustment payment
would be made by either the transferor (if actual tax rate turns out to
be lower than the assumed rate) or by the transferee (vice versa). To
determine the actual tax rate, the transferor’s actual tax liability for
the taxable year would have to be compared with the transferor’s
hypothetical tax liability if the taxable income from the stock right in
question was not included.176 Accordingly, “dummy” tax returns (i.e.,
returns prepared but not filed), including state and local returns in
jurisdictions that have income taxes, would have to be prepared for
each year in which the transferor realizes stock-right income on
behalf of the transferee. Preparing these dummy tax returns would

175. The indemnity would require the transferor to reimburse the transferee for any
income taxes that reduced the payment to the transferee. The transferor would be able to
recover that amount from the IRS through a claim for refund based on the IRS’s reversal
of the carve-out language in Rev. Rul. 2002-22.
176. Because of the complex interaction between state and local taxes and federal
taxes and the multitude of phaseouts that potentially apply, the real rate is often not
determinable without actually preparing a second set of dummy tax returns.
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involve some cost.177 In addition, the entire procedure can be viewed
as unwieldy, particularly because the transferor spouse would have to
share sensitive tax information with her former spouse to allow the
latter to confirm that the calculations are correct. The benefits of
precision from using the actual rate must be weighed against the cost,
complexity, and information-sharing issues arising from using the
actual rate. In many cases, the precision benefits of using the actual
rate are not worth the trouble.
The alternative is for the parties to agree to a stipulated rate. For
very high-income transferors, something like “the sum of the highest
marginal federal income tax rate in § 1 of the Internal Revenue Code,
the highest Medicare tax rate (including the additional 0.9%
Medicare tax rate) and the highest state and local income tax rate
then in effect in the applicable state and local jurisdictions” could be
used. This stipulated rate would not be perfect. It might err on the
high side because state and local income taxes are generally
deductible, which lowers the combined effective marginal tax rate.178
On the other hand, the assumed rate does not take deduction
phaseouts and other similar hidden tax rate increases into account. In
many cases, these two competing effects (i.e., disregarding the
deductibility of state and local taxes and disregarding phaseouts) can
end up roughly canceling each other out. Alternatively, a stipulated
nominal rate, such as 50%, could be used.179 In that case, the parties
should consider an automatic adjustment if statutory rates eventually
change by more than an insignificant amount.
Once the tax rate—whether actual or stipulated—is determined,
the transferor would use that rate in determining the amount of
payment that he must deliver to the transferee shortly after the
taxable event (i.e., vesting, exercise, or payout). If a stipulated rate is
used, a single, correct payment amount can simply be delivered for
each event. As described above, if the actual rate is used, a more
complicated two-step payment process would be required.

177. In addition, if the transferor’s actual rate is used, procedures would have to be
developed to deal with the situation where the transferor ends up filing an amended return
because the changes on that return could change the effective rate of tax paid by the
transferor on the stock-right income.
178. And although taxpayers subject to the AMT will lose the benefit of their state and
local tax deductions, the effective marginal rate in those cases would still be lower than the
highest marginal rate under the regular income tax. See I.R.C. § 1 (2012) (providing top
rate of 39.6%).
179. See, e.g., Vuotto & Urbach, supra note 152 (providing sample constructive trust
terms using a 44% stipulated tax rate).
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
As discussed above, while Revenue Ruling 2002-22 settled the
treatment of transfers of vested stock rights in divorce, the treatment
of transfers of unvested stock rights remains unclear. The language in
the ruling seems to suggest that the transferor remains taxable on
these items, while a nonprecedential private letter ruling allowed for
the opposite result. This uncertainty necessitates the socially wasteful
tax planning discussed in Part IV.D., and even after engaging in this
planning, taxpayers still are at risk that the IRS could disagree with
the approach taken. To avoid these unnecessary costs and
complexities, the tax administration should immediately issue
precedential guidance on which taxpayers could rely.180
One possibility would be for the Treasury to promulgate a
regulation or for the IRS to issue a revenue ruling that would require
the transferor spouse to report the income from unvested stock rights
upon the eventual taxable event. For transfers of restricted stock that
will vest upon the performance of services by the transferor spouse, as
well as settled-upon-vesting PSUs, the assignment of income doctrine
appears to require that result.181 For transfers of other types of stock
rights, such as unvested NQSOs, the tax treatment is more uncertain
because the taxable event occurs not upon vesting (i.e., “earning”)
but upon subsequent exercise.182 Thus, some or perhaps all of the
taxable income is attributable not to the transferor’s services, but
rather to the transferee’s investment decision to delay exercise after
vesting. Although this suggests that the purely correct tax treatment
would be to split the income between the transferor and transferee
180. In theory, Congress could enact a clarifying statute, but given the current hostile
tax legislative climate as well as the fact that Congress typically has left technical
assignment of income issues to the Treasury and IRS, see, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2002-22, 2001-1
C.B. 849, we are not optimistic about the prospect of legislative reform. Of course, if
Congress were to intervene, it could do so on a clean slate, unburdened by existing
doctrine and based purely on policy considerations, unlike the executive agencies, which
must ensure that their rulings are consistent with the existing statutory scheme. From a
pure policy perspective, the issue is whether the greater precision of taxing unvested rights
to the transferor justifies the additional complexity from having completely different tax
regimes for taxing vested versus unvested rights. For the reasons discussed below (i.e., the
limited revenue at stake and the unlikelihood of behavioral distortion), our sense is that
the precision is not worth the administrative cost, so we would recommend that, if
Congress were to act, it should provide that the transferee of unvested stock rights is taxed
upon the eventual taxable event, consistent with the way that vested rights are taxed.
181. See Kochansky v. Comm’r, 92 F.3d 957, 958 (9th Cir. 1996).
182. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (explaining that, while the assignment
of income doctrine appears to apply neatly to unvested stock, its application to unvested
stock options is more unclear because the vesting event and the taxable event do not occur
simultaneously).
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spouses, such an approach would require premature valuation of
options and create significant administrative complexity. Therefore,
we are confident that, if the government were to provide precedential
guidance that the transferor of unvested options is taxed in full upon
the eventual taxable event, it would constitute a valid exercise of
administrative authority.
On the other hand, if the government were to take the contrary
position that the transferee is taxed, it is possible that the guidance
would be held invalid. Transferees, who may have an incentive to
challenge the guidance to avoid paying the resulting tax,183 could
argue that the guidance is inconsistent with the settled law as
evidenced by the Kochansky case and other assignment of income
authorities. Whether such a challenge would be successful is
uncertain, but the risk is significant. And if the guidance were struck
down, it could result in avoidance of taxation by transferees, who
would argue that the guidance is ineffective against them, as well as
transferors, who would argue that the guidance is nevertheless
binding on the government vis-à-vis them.184 Even if the government
could ultimately collect tax from transferors, the result would be a
potential windfall to transferees at the expense of transferors.185
To avoid these potential complications, we believe it would be
better for the government to issue binding guidance confirming that
the transferor remains taxable on unvested rights, which is most
consistent with the existing assignment of income doctrine and
therefore unlikely to be successfully challenged. While such an
approach would eliminate the legal uncertainty, the consequences
would still be somewhat complicated because it would result in two
diametrically opposed tax regimes, depending on whether stock rights
were vested or unvested at the time of the divorce. This inconsistency
is counterintuitive and easy to gloss over. For instance, the IRS in
PLR 201016031 appeared to overlook the fact that the rights in
question were unvested. Furthermore, as explained above, the
treatment of vested stock rights is already counterintuitively
inconsistent as between income tax and employment tax

183. It is possible that certain transferees would not have an incentive to challenge the
guidance. For instance, a carefully drafted marital settlement agreement should include an
indemnity in favor of the transferor that would take away this incentive.
184. A transferor might also avoid tax because the statute of limitations had passed
before the IRS sought to tax her.
185. If a contractual indemnity in favor of the transferor was in the marital settlement
agreement, see supra note 179 and accompanying text, then there would be no windfall.
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consequences; having opposite regimes for vested versus unvested
rights adds complexity on top of complexity.
With that in mind, the IRS should consider issuing a safe harbor
that would allow the parties to provide in their marital settlement that
the transferee agrees to be taxed on unvested rights in the same
manner as she would have been taxed had the rights been fully
vested. The safe harbor would announce that the IRS would respect
such an agreement. There are several precedents in the tax law
regarding divorce transactions that explicitly allow this sort of private
ordering of tax liability,186 and this would be consistent with that
approach.187
The safe harbor, however, would not be costless. In cases where
the transferee is in the lower tax bracket, it allows for additional taxadvantageous income shifting. While this is certainly a cost, our sense
is that it is not significant enough to outweigh the administrative
advantages of the safe harbor. In many situations, particularly in high
net worth divorces, there will not be any tax rate differential to
exploit. In addition, to the extent there are tax rate differences, the
parties can already exploit them very easily using transfers of vested
stock rights. Finally, even if the safe harbor does allow additional
income splitting at the margin in a particular case, the advantage is
capped because at some point the transferee will be put in the same
(or higher) marginal tax rate as the transferor. All of this suggests that

186. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(B) (2012) (allowing former spouses to agree to treat
payments that would otherwise qualify as deductible and includible alimony as
nondeductible and excludible payments); Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-2(c)(1) (as amended in
2003) (allowing former spouses to agree to treat redemptions of corporate stock as
distributions on stock); Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-2(c)(2) (allowing former spouses to agree to
treat distributions on stock as redemptions).
187. One technical issue is whether a promise by the transferee in the marital
settlement agreement to report and pay the eventual tax on unvested stock rights will be
binding on the transferee in an action by the IRS to collect the tax if the transferee fails to
pay. The resolution depends on whether the IRS is considered a third-party beneficiary of
the transferee’s promise to the transferor, which is a complicated question intersecting tax
and contract law that is beyond the scope of this Article. In a similar private ordering rule
in the divorce context, the government appears to believe that it would be a third-party
beneficiary. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-2(c)(1)–(2) (allowing the divorcing parties to report a
transaction in a manner inconsistent with “applicable tax law” provided that they
expressly agree that both spouses intend to report the transactions in such a manner). In
an abundance of caution, the IRS might consider requiring, as a condition for the
application of the safe harbor, the transferee spouse to check a box on a tax form (or
attach a statement to the tax return) that waives the right to assert that the assignment of
income doctrine causes the income to be taxable to the former spouse. In such a case, the
marital settlement agreement should require the transferee to check that box (or attach
the statement) to protect the transferor.
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the revenue loss from the safe harbor can be expected to be relatively
small.188
In addition to revenue concerns, the prospect of behavioral
distortion needs to be considered. In this context, however, we expect
there to be little, if any, distortion. First, stock rights issuances require
company action. Stock rights are not going to become more favored
simply because there will be marginally greater income-shifting
opportunities if and when there is a divorce. And, even in cases where
a divorce is imminent, companies are not likely to rush to grant a
divorcing executive additional unvested stock rights.189 Finally, we
would expect that the deals struck in marital settlement agreements
would not be altered by virtue of this rule. In a world without taxes,
the pro rata division of stock rights would usually make the most
sense, due to valuation problems. Under the safe harbor approach, we
would expect to see the same pro rata division. If anything, taxing the
transferor on unvested rights would be more likely to distort marital
settlements by encouraging parties where income shifting is beneficial
to affect their equitable distribution using only vested stock rights;
this would require burdensome valuation of both vested and unvested
stock rights. In sum, the behavioral distortion should be negligible.
CONCLUSION
The transfer of stock rights in divorce may create beneficial
planning opportunities to shift income from a high-bracket spouse to
a lower-bracket spouse. It is now clear that income arising from
vested stock options transferred in divorce is taxable to the transferee
spouse, and this rule should apply to vested SARs, as well. However,
the state of the law with respect to transfers of unvested stock rights
remains uncertain. Because the IRS has taken the position in a recent
private ruling that income from the vesting of restricted stock
transferred in divorce was taxable to the transferee spouse, taxpayers
may find that the expense of seeking a private ruling justifies the
188. It can also be argued that allowing additional income splitting effectively extends
the so-called “marriage bonus” from which the couple was likely benefiting before the
divorce. Cf. Geier, supra note 79, at 365–66 (arguing for allowing easier income-shifting in
the context of alimony payments based on the loss of the marriage bonus). While this
effect does not reduce the revenue loss from the proposed safe harbor (since the parties
will no longer be married regardless of the existence of the safe harbor), it could be used
to help justify the safe harbor on fairness grounds. For discussion of the marriage bonus,
see generally Lawrence Zelenak, For Better and Worse: The Differing Income Tax
Treatments of Marriage at Different Income Levels, 93 N.C. L. Rev. 783 (2015).
189. In fact, for nontax reasons, an imminently divorcing executive usually would
prefer for the company to delay granting options until after the divorce is final.
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assurance of that outcome, particularly if the transferee spouse is in a
lower tax bracket than the transferor. In the absence of such a ruling,
practitioners should proceed with caution, as Revenue Ruling 2002-22
and Kochansky arguably support the position that the transferor
spouse remains taxable on income from unvested stock rights
transferred in divorce. Taxpayers seeking to avoid this outcome
should either avoid transfers of unvested stock rights altogether or
adopt a constructive trust approach. While a constructive trust would
not allow the parties to take advantage of income shifting to a lowerbracket spouse, it would allow the transferee to effectively bear the
burden of the tax while keeping the nominal burden on the
transferor. Additionally, because the employment tax burden will be
determined by reference to the transferor employee’s tax wages in
any event, the parties should take care to specify which spouse will
ultimately bear the burden of those taxes.
That said, the existing doctrine in this area is unnecessarily
confusing and complicated. We therefore suggest that the government
issue guidance that (i) clarifies that the transferor is taxed on income
from unvested stock rights (for both income and employment tax
purposes) upon the eventual taxable event but (ii) nevertheless allows
the former spouses to agree that the transferee will be taxed on those
rights (consistent with the tax treatment of vested stock rights). Such
an approach appropriately balances practical and policy
considerations, while insulating the government from potential
administrative law challenges.

